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Abstract 
 
 Citizens' trust in political institutions is central to the understanding of the way people behave in a 
democracy.  This paper seeks to contribute to the emerging literature that investigates the relationship between voters' 
experiences as electoral winners and losers and political trust.  Specifically, we argue that the effect of winning and 
losing on how voters think about their representatives in power varies depending upon individuals' prior political 
experiences.  We contend that the process of political socialization mediates winners and losers' trust in government. 
Citizens whose political values were shaped in anti-democratic regimes have different reactions to winning and 
losing than those individuals who have only experienced life in democracy.  Specifically, winning and losing will be 
more important in determining political trust for voters having lived under authoritarian rule and democratic regime, 
what we call the “dual-regime” generation,  than for voters having solely had contact with democratic institutions, 
what we call the “democratically socialized” generation. 
Using individual-level Eurobarometer data, we address three questions: 1.) whether an individual's belongs 
to “dual-regime” generation or the “democratically socialized” generation has different effects on political trust; 2.) 
whether the strength of the effect of winning/losing on political trust is stronger for one generation than the other; and 
3.) whether the effect of winning/losing among the “dual-regime” generation is stronger in new democracies than for 
the same generation in democracies that did not undergo a recent transition.  To address these questions, we propose 
to compare levels of trust and the impact of winning and losing on trust among different generations across three 
newly consolidated democracies, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the former East Germany  and compare these to three 
long-time democracies, Denmark, Belgium, and the UK.  This allows us to see if there are differences among the 
dual-regime generation in the newer democracies relative to the same generation in countries that have stable 
democracies. 
First, we hypothesize that the older, dual-regime political generation is more or less trusting because they 
have experienced a breakdown of an entire political system and have witnessed a value-laden fight for political 
transparency and participation.  Thus, they know first-hand that political regimes are vulnerable and volatile even 
after the regime has consolidated. We found that this experience the older generation in newer democracies tend to be 
more trusting than the those who have only known the regime in which they live and for which they do not have 
powerful politically charged expectations. The fact that they have experienced the worst in political life, where trust 
is unheard of, gives the democratic regime a cushion of support because these older individuals are more willing to 
give a democratic government the benefit of the doubt.    
Second, we argue that those individuals who in the past experienced  repression may place a greater emphasis on 
winning and losing in elections because they have a comparatively higher probability of believing that systems can 
and do break down.  Thus, compared to their younger compatriots and people of their own generation who have not 
experienced breakdown, winning will have a stronger positive and losing a stronger negative effect on trust because 
there is some probability that elections will not be held again, thus determining winners and losers for the foreseeable 
future.  
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Introduction 
“Popular confidence in democratic institutions is at the heart of 
representative government. Widespread confidence reduces the potential for 
radical change to the system, but it also encourages a constructive desire for social 
reform” (McAllister 1999: 202). 
 
 Political trust is a central pillar of democratic theory and for the past 30 years it has 
occupied the minds of many political scientists devoted to the study of democratic governance. 
It is an essential element to popular control of policy and support for the democratic regime, 
both diffuse and specific (Easton 1965) because as a “valued commodity in democratic polities” 
(Marsh 1971), confidence in the ruling political institutions helps determine individual 
attachment to the political framework and the workings of the existing political system. 
Disenchantment, distrust, and cynicism—in a word dissatisfaction—contribute to political 
alienation (Citrin 1974; Lockerbie 1993) and undermine the very essence of democracy. When 
people trust in the regime and its institutions, they are more likely to participate in politics so as 
to change their lives (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Jennings and Niemi 1981). They 
are less likely to want to change it (Lambert et al. 1986; Topf 1995) because they are satisfied 
with the institutional arrangements and this contributes to their legitimacy and stability in the 
long run (Easton and Dennis 1969). Trust in political institutions influences how people look 
and feel toward the government and ultimately how they behave. “Democratic institutions are 
believed vulnerable to breakdown in times crisis unless rooted in shared norms of political trust, 
tolerance, respect for human rights, willingness to compromise, moderation, and belief in 
democratic legitimacy.” (Norris 1999: 264).   
 Miller (1974b) argues that political trust has a different meaning or significance in 
different political systems. In newer democracies, trust in governmental institutions may be 
more of a vote of confidence in the form of government, whereas in democracies that have been 
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in existence for a longer time, distrust in government may be associated with the partisan hopes 
of “voting the rascals out” (p. 989).  In newer democracies, the institutions are in the process of 
stabilizing so the citizens have not yet had the opportunity to have positive political 
experiences. In the first years of democratization, these institutions are adjusting (Dahl 1989; 
Converse 1969) and are still in a precarious phase. 
In these newer democracies it is likely that those individuals coming out of the 
authoritarian regime have different ideas and attitudes regarding the new regime than do those 
individuals having been socialized in democratic values from the start (Converse 1969). 
Holmberg (1999) argues that political trust can be conditioned by the “differing social 
backgrounds, cognitive abilities, party identifications, and values” (p.114). It is plausible to 
argue that political events, such as the revolutionary overturn of a dictatorship, could constitute 
a distinctive mark on those having lived it. It would distinguish or mark their social 
backgrounds from others and would thus create a particular political generation.  
Kenneth Newton (1999) has suggested that political trust studies have not given 
political experience its due attention (Abramson 1979; Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 
1997). Having experienced life in an authoritarian regime, the revolutionary generation knows 
what it is like not to be able to participate in political life, to have their opinions suppressed and 
to be reprimanded, threatened and even punished for doing so. This generation of political 
citizens also knows first-hand that political regimes are vulnerable and volatile, having 
witnessed to the breakdown of the dictatorial regime. It is highly likely that belonging to this 
generation of folks would make a difference when explaining political trust and support for the 
democratic regime. Not only that, it can affect how citizens feel about winning and losing. 
In this paper, we test how belonging to the “revolutionary” or “dual regime” generation 
or the “democratically socialized” generation affects citizens´ confidence in the governing 
institutions, and how, if at all, they condition winning and losing in democracy.  How does 
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regime experience affect trust? And what will the end of the older revolutionary generation 
signify for the confidence in democratic governance? Drawing on the political socialization 
literature, we contend that citizens now living in democracy but whose political values were 
shaped in antidemocratic regimes view democracy in a different light than do those having only 
known the “rules of the democratic game” (Converse 1969). Do they trust more or less? We 
argue  that political socialization in a regime other than the democratic regime will either 
increase or decrease an individual´s trust in the new democratic regime. 
We begin by reviewing the literature in the context of our research question and 
develop our argument.  Using Eurobarometer individual-level data, we test our hypotheses and 
discuss the impact of differences in political experience on political trust.  
Political Socialization and Political Trust 
A critical conditioning aspect of political confidence in a governing regime is political 
socialization.  Its importance lies in the preadult preparation and formation of values that young 
adults carry on in some way throughout adulthood. Considerable debate has surrounded 
political socialization as either an ongoing process or a process that precedes political 
involvement. The two opposing views mark the essence of central debates in nearly three 
decades of research on the socialization process. 
David Sears (1975; 1983) discusses five different types of effects on preadult political 
predispositions. These vary from the “lifelong openness” view to an extreme opposite, the 
“persistence “ perspective (Sears and Valentino 1997).  The first posits that individuals are 
perpetually reactive or responsive to changing realities.  The “persistence” hypothesis asserts 
that although people may be aware of the political events going on, particular values and 
attitudes are acquired in their early formative years and accompany them while conditioning 
their rationality. 
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Between these two extremes of the socialization continuum, lie the life-cycle 
hypothesis, the impressionable years hypothesis, and the generational effects hypothesis, where 
according to the life-cycle proposition individuals express changing ideas and exhibit changing 
values as they age.  “…certain kinds of change are endemic to the life course.” (Jennings and 
Niemi 1981:118). Thus, younger individuals, irrespective of the particular time or political era 
will think and act in a way convergent toward the older individuals as they pass through time 
(Jennings and Niemi 1981; Niemi and Jennings 1991). 
The remaining two hypotheses, the impressionable years hypothesis and the 
generational effects hypothesis, can both be interpreted as impacts resulting from events that 
occur during a given period in time: 1.)the impressionable or critical years according to the 
hypothesis that bears the same name, or 2.) any time period according to the generational effect 
hypothesis. These impacts set the individuals having witnessed these events apart from those 
not having done so. The literature points out a few examples of highly salient political 
generations such as the “Depression generation”, the  “protest generation” and the “Civil War 
generation” (Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 1997). These individuals pertaining to these 
generations exhibit a distinct characteristic in a political sense and are easily labeled according 
to the particular political or historical event that generated the common ground among them. It 
is plausible to argue that their political views and behavior in the face of occurring exogenous 
social and political phenomena may likely be tainted.  
All five socialization hypotheses can be expressed or summarized as period effects, 
where individuals of all cognitive ages are marked by the current occurrences in their 
surrounding; age effects, where political attitudes vary depending on the age of individual; and 
cohort effects where particular attitudes are common to individuals born in a particular point in 
time (Sears 1975). 
 5
A Generational Theory of Political Trust: The Role of Political Regime Experience 
 “In general, … the conclusion is that economic conditions are more 
important than social ones, but together their impact is negligible when 
compared to such factors as political, cultural, or historical circumstances.” 
(McAllister 1999: 201, 203 italics in the orginal). 
 
 We often read of life-cycle explanations of political trust, where an individual´s affect 
for the governing regime changes with age.  Next to the winner/loser effect (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997) or the “hometeam effect” (Holmberg 1999), age has been given considerable 
attention where confidence and support for democracy are concerned. It is perhaps the 
demographic variable showing the most consistent effect (Newton 1999; Listhaug and Wiberg 
1995; Dennis 1991; Inglehart 1999). Generally speaking, political trust is positively correlated 
with age, where older more experience individuals tend to feel integrated in the political system 
and to participate in the election process (Lockerbie 1993; Topf 1995; Listhaug 1995). Younger 
individuals are less inclined to identify with a party and are less loyal, therefore politically more 
flexible (Erikson et al. 1980; Abramson 1979; Converse 1969; Inglehart 1999).   
Notwithstanding this life-cycle relationship between political trust and age, it is 
plausible to argue a coexisting generational hypothesis between trust and a given political event. 
In this way, exogenous political events emerge as critical socializing and “catalyzing” agents 
(Sears and Valentino 1997). Traditionally, the political socialization literature points to the 
family as being the most influential agents in setting political predispositions (Hyman 1959; 
Almond and Verba 1963; Langton 1969) and school (Almond and Verba 1963; Hess and 
Torney 1967). More recently, specific exogenous, historic, and/or political events or 
socioeconomic changes have been noted to play a significant role in shaping one´s affect for a 
regime (Abramson 1979; Jennings 1987; Sears and Valentino 1997). The more pronounced or 
visible these experiences, the more likely it will be that those individuals coming of age during 
these periods will emerge as a salient group or a “generational unit” (Mannheim 1952) of a 
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given degree of likeness in political outlook. The event will characterize the generation and 
emerge as its symbolic mark and according to the generational hypothesis will manifest itself in 
its political attitudes and behavior. 
In this paper, we propose that theory and history suggest potential generational 
differences.   We focus on regime changes as the political system changes that become the 
critical political event identifying different political generations. 
The change in regime in some Western European countries provides political scientists 
with an opportunity to study generational effects. Whereas considerable research has been 
conducted on the economic effects on political trust in the U.S. and Western European 
democracies, very few studies have focused on the political factors other than the “hometeam 
effect” so that cross-cultural comparative research on the impact of political events is lacking in 
this respect. 
We hypothesize that individuals belonging to or having been cultured in an 
authoritarian regime and subjected to radical change such as the breakdown of the governing 
structure as they know it will react differently as they adjust to the new emerging political 
institutions than will the generations of the “relevant” political socialization age” (Converse 
1969) that have only known these new democratic institutions. We test this argument by sorting 
out generational effects from maturation effects due to age. The difference in political trust 
could be attributed to the idea that the democratically socialized generation also happens to be 
the younger of the two generations and are, therefore, in a different stage in the life-cycle.  
However, in this case, history suggests that they may be due to the fact that they belong to an 
entirely new political group of individuals. 
Ian McAllister (1999: 194) speaks of the need to incorporate the role of democratic 
experience in our line of argument where political confidence is considered. He presents a  
simple scatterplot of confidence against the number of years a democracy has been  in existence 
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based on the 1990-91 World Values Survey and suggests that the highest tier of political 
confidence is typical of the longer, more stable democracies, and the lowest tiers, less well-
established or more recent democracies. 
Kenneth Newton´s (1999) distinction and comparison of political trust in early and 
more contemporary democracies is consistent with this idea. He speculates that in newly 
established democracies there should be less distrust given a more narrow scope in 
governmental intrusion and a more loyal relationship between citizens and the parties. There are 
relatively speaking lower expectations in these early democracies. This is in part because 
politics is more ideological, religious, and socially based in these countries than the “catch all” 
party politics of the more stable democracies.  People rely on the politically more 
knowledgeable elite to ensure a smoother process of nation-building than they do in older 
democracies characterized by the individualistic, pragmatic, and more critical outlook on 
political governance. Democratic standards grow over the years, and, for this reason, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to satisfy them (Miller and Listhaug 1990).  
This line of reasoning inspired our research question: whether people socialized in two 
different regimes vary in how they trust in democratic, representative institutions, so that one 
political generation will deem these institutions more trustworthy than the other. In countries 
where this generational distinction applies, political trust may be more than a life-cycle 
explanation. Because those belonging to the first group or generation are also older than the 
second group, the dominant position on the effect of age on political trust would lead one to 
suspect that they would trust more (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). However, given the role of 
political experience as a socialization agent, there may be more going on than just an age or life-
cycle effect. These citizens are not just an older generation but they are a different political 
generation unto themselves.  
Which political generation trusts more is a matter of hypothetical evaluation. As we see 
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it, there are two lines of reasoning here. The experience of what political oppression is like and 
the satisfaction of overcoming it may tip the trust level in a democratic regime in a positive 
direction.  The fact that the new regime came about as a result of these individuals´ discontent 
may have a cognitive, value-laden affect for the new regime. Individuals may bring their 
attitudes toward the new institutions in line with their victorious accomplishment. According to 
this line of argument, then the “dual-regime” generation should feel more loyal to the new 
regime and, therefore, trust in it more than would the new political generation born of a 
democratic regime. They would be willing to give the expected ups and downs of an emerging 
regime the benefit of the doubt. Also, the democratically socialized generation could be more 
sophisticated and expect more of democracy so that they are more critical and less trusting 
(Inglehart 1999; Norris 1999). 
On the other hand, these circumstances could work the other way around.  The older, 
“dual-regime” generation could be less trusting precisely because they have experienced a 
breakdown of an entire political system.  Thus, they know first-hand that political regimes are 
not perpetual. In addition, the older generation may have experienced some degree of political 
dismay or dissatisfaction as the nation-building process progressed because they may have 
formed high expectations for the actors and institutions in democracy and these may have not 
lived up to those expectations (see Anderson and O´Connor 2000 on system change effects on 
citizen´s perceptions).  In this sense, they would tend to be less trusting than those who have 
only known life in democracy. So according to this viewpoint, younger citizens not having 
another political regime with which to compare with democracy would be more politically 
trusting. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Political trust differs depending on the political generations. 
Belonging to one generation rather than the other increases the probability of 
trust in the political institutions. 
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 We also take our question a step further and enquire about the effect that the experience 
or inexperience with an antidemocratic regime can have on a more widely researched political 
effect: the winner/loser effect on the institutional confidence.  Christopher Anderson et al. 
(2000) investigated this effect in new and mature democracies, hypothesizing that a nation´s 
democratic history affects the extent to which political minority and majority status or, in other 
words, the effect of being a winner or loser, affects people´s willingness to protest against their 
governing regime. They found that in newer democracies, winners have a higher stake in the 
system. Recently established democratic institutions inflate an individual´s stake in the system 
so that being in the majority in an early stage of democratic development has a greater impact 
on one´s sense of being a winner.  
In light of these findings, regardless of whether one is a member of the “dual regime” 
generation or the “democratically socialized” generation, we expect that being winner should 
have an effect on political trust, and it should take on added significance depending on the 
generation. One generation should be more sensitive about having more say in what ideological 
inclinations should orient their nation. Lambert et al. (1986) points out that the strength of the 
relation between trust and partisanship should be greater in the more responsive political 
systems that have had time to “accumulate a reservoir of popular goodwill” (McAllister 1999: 
202). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The process of political socialization mediates winners´ and losers´ 
trust in political institutions so that winning and losing will be more important in 
determining political trust for one generation than for the other.   
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Data and Model 
 To investigate the effects of regime experience on political confidence, we conduct 
logit analyses using individual-level data for 12 Western European democracies in 1994. The 
source of these data is Eurobarometer 42, for which the fieldwork was conducted from 
November 14 to December 31, 1994.  This is the most recent Eurobarometer that asks questions 
on political trust.  In eleven countries, there are approximately 1000 respondents. In Germany, 
about 1000 respondents in both East and West Germany were surveyed. Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, and the former East Germany represent the newly established democracies with 
respondents from both political generations. The UK, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany represent the older, more stable democracies 
having only the democratic generation. 
In addition to the trust variables, the survey also asked about questions pertaining to 
past voting behavior, used to construct the winner/loser variable. In addition, the survey 
included questions on economic perceptions, interest in politics, Left-Right self-placement 
questions, and the typical socioeconomic and demographic variables.  We also include a 
generation and a regime experience variable, relying on the respondent´s age. We construct a 
regime experience variable that splits a nation´s respondents into two political generations, our 
“dual-regime” generation and “democratic” socialized generation. The generation variable 
divides a nation´s population into two age brackets corresponding to the age brackets of those 
individuals falling into the two political generations. For a description of the variables used and 
their descriptive statistics see Table 1.  Table 2 shows the proportions of the regime experience 
and generation variables and Table 3 compares the means of some key variables.  
Trust in the national government and in the national parliament is evenly divided 
between those who distrust and those who do not. Approximately three fourths of the sample 
respondents are 30 or older and about a quarter of these were accustomed political repression in 
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a dictatorial regime. In the newer democracies, this dual regime experience covers about 78% of 
the respondents. The typical survey respondent in the pooled sample is aged 43-44, has an 
education level of approximately five on a 10-point scale, corresponding to about 12 years of 
schooling and belongs to the lower middle class.  He or she is somewhat interested in politics, 
scoring about a 2 on a 5 point scale, and perceives the economy to have remained the same in 
the previous year. Ideologically, he or she is situated in the Center, slightly tipping in a Leftist 
direction, and is about as likely to be a winner or a loser, with the probability of being a loser 
being about .2 more than that of being a winner. 
[Table 1-3 about here] 
 The following model depicts our view of the determinants of political confidence:  
Trust = β0 + β1Winner/Loser + β2Regime+ β3Age + β4EconPercep + β5Ideol + β6IntPol + 
β7Educ + β8Class + β9Gender  (+ β1(WinnerLoser*Regime) used in the interactive 
model) + Country effects 
where, 
  Trust: Political trust                 EconPercep: Government Supportt-1 
            Winner/Loser: Effect of winning and losing    Ideol: Left-Right score 
            Regime: Regime experience     IntPol: Interest in Politics 
            Age: Exact age                                       Educ: Level of education 
            Class:  Social class of the respondent            Gender: Gender of the respondent 
            (WinnerLoser*Regime): Interaction term 
 
Dependent Variable          
 The model is estimated for each of two dependent variables: trust in the national 
government and trust in the national parliament. Considerable debate has been generated over 
the measurement of the political trust variable. This controversy is centered on the need to 
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distinguish between institutions and institutional actors (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974b; Listhaug 
1995; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Miller and Listhaug 1990) and this distinction based on how 
this variable is measured. It is not a straightforward matter for whether the trust variable 
measures confidence in the regime and institutions or the incumbent political leader makes a 
difference to the inferences we draw and the political implications thereof. People may not trust 
the specific government while maintaining faith in the institutions per se. Miller (1974a) 
assumed that the trust in government scale used in U.S. studies on political trust and alienation, 
captures respondents´ trust in the political regime; and in a counterargument to Citrin´s (1974) 
opposite opinion on the matter, points out that political trust may have a different meaning for 
people living in different political systems. In a later publication on political trust in the 
Scandinavian countries, Miller and Listhaug (1990: 385) argue that what may have started out 
as a decline in specific support for democratic governance eventually came to affect people´s 
support for the political regime so that “…it would be a mistake to conclude that the increased 
distrust represented a superficial response to unpopular leaders or political rhetoric.”  
“Distrust obviously has other implications in a two-hundred-year-old 
democracy than it would in a dictatorship that has been in existence for only 
a brief period…Distrust of government in the U.S. may, for some, be 
associated with the partisan bias of ´voting the rascals out´; for others, it may 
indicate a sense of enduring inequities in government decisions and outputs.” 
(Miller 1974b: 989, internal quotes in the original).  
 
We can extend this thought to include democracies that have been in existence for a short time. 
Citrin (1974) argued that the trust in government scale is an indicator of the approval or 
disapproval of the people governing these institutions.  
 In this paper, political trust is measured as a dichotomous variable based on a yes-no 
question regarding on the reliability on the national government and the national parliament. We 
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assume that the question wording captures respondents´ trust in the institutions themselves and 
not the incumbent (see appendix).  
Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables employed in this model include those of a political nature—  
regime experience, past vote (recoded as the winner/loser effect), ideological inclination, 
sociotropic economic perceptions, interest in politics and those of a socio-economic—and 
demographic nature—age, education level, social class, and gender. 
 In our additive model, regime experience1 is the key variable. It is designed to estimate 
the effect  that having been socialized in the different regime has on one´s trust in the 
democratic regime relative to those having lived only in democracy. In our interactive model, 
regime experience mediates the winner-loser effect. The logic behind this variable is that we 
assume a relevant political socialization age separating the Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, and 
East German respondents into two political “generational units” (Mannheim 1952).  The cut-off 
age between an adolescent pre-socialized in political matters and a politically unaware 
adolescent is arguable, but we base our judgment on the available literature on this matter. 
Political socialization is thought to begin at home within the family and social groups, at school, 
and media contact. Which of these pulls the greatest weight when it comes to socialization gains 
is not a consensual matter. As discussed above, some regard the family as the primary agent of 
socialization (Hyman 1959; Langton 1969). Others the school and communication agents 
outside the family to have the greatest impact (Hess and Torney 1967). Still others believe 
exogenous political occurrences play an essential role (Jennings and Niemi, 1967; Sears and 
Valentino 1997). The question is when an adolescent politically conscious of the institutions 
                                                          
1 In the sample of older democracies, this variable is replaced with the generation variable, which 
operationally coincides with the regime experience variable for the newer democracies. This allows us to 
compare the generational effects across older and newly established democracies. 
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and the governing structure?  Chaffee and Tims (1982) refer to ´preadolescense´ and Philip 
Converse (1969) places a number on this age group. According to him, the age of 15 is the 
relevant political socialization age. Sears (1975) and Dennis et al. (1971) speak of a 8-15 range 
with political sophistication increasing from one extreme to the other; Stradling (1971) focuses 
on the 8-10 age range; and Erikson and Luttbeg (1973) opt for a midpoint in this range as they 
refer to children aged 13 as political beings.  
 These political socialization studies were all conducted in democracies that have been 
in existence for quite some time. In newer democracies, family is likely to occupy a comparably 
more relevant role because we expect that in a dictatorship with censorship in the media and in 
the schools, children would more likely be subjected to what they witnessed or heard going on 
in their homes.  Adults discussed politics, especially dissenting views, in the privacy of their 
homes. We could argue that the frequency of political discussions in the home was greater in 
authoritarian regimes, than in a democracy, thus we could speculate that children would be 
subjected to politics sooner in these countries than in longer existing democracies.  
 We opted to use the age of 10 as the relevant age for the Portuguese, Spanish, and 
Greek respondents. The transition to democracy occurred at or about the same time frame.2 
Therefore, our reasoning led us to make 30 the dividing age between political generations. 
Children aged 10 in 1974 would be 30 years old in 1994, the year the survey was conducted. In 
the case of East Germany, the same underlying rationale would make 14 the cut-off age.  Thus, 
those individuals comprising the dual regime generation would be 30 or older in the first three 
of these democracies and 14 or older in the former East Germany. All other respondents below 
these ages belong to the democratic generation. Critics will argue that we cannot operationally 
sort out the effect due to age from the effect we want to test due to regime experience, but, the 
                                                          
2 The transition years are 1974 for Portugal, 1977 for Spain, and 1974 for Greece. 
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regime dummy, based on the age variable, is not the same thing. By estimating the same model 
separately for the newly established democracies and the mature democracies, we can draw 
inference about the difference in coefficients.  
 If a person voted for the party in government in the last election, the winnerloser effect, 
he or she is more likely to evaluate the economic situation in the country positively, but if he or 
she voted for a different party he or she is more likely to perceive the economic situation 
negatively. The existing literature on trust also demands that we control for economic 
perceptions. As has been the case in the literature, a nation´s economic performance will be 
positively related to the probability of trust.  
 The remaining variables are principally included as precautionary controls. These 
demographic variables—education, class, and gender—are not regarded as powerful 
determinants of trust (Listhaug 1995). However, age is of particular interest. It has been 
regarded as the demographic variable revealing the most consistent effect. Generally speaking, 
and, in accord with the life-cycle hypothesis, in political socialization, older individuals are 
more likely to feel more integrated in the political system. They are also experienced 
individuals meaning that they have lived through political and economic fluctuations and would 
be less likely to distrust or blame the political regime for what they could regard as temporary 
situations (Lockerbie 1993). Thus, we should expect to see that political trust increases with 
age.  
 Education is expected to have a negative effect on political confidence. The more 
educated respondents are socialized in the “political mainstream”, the more informed, they tend 
to be and one could argue that the more likely they are to hold higher political expectations of 
the governing institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Lockerbie 1989). The gender variable 
really could go either way. On the one hand, women are more vulnerable in a political sense 
than are men, and for this reason, we  might expect women to be more likely to distrust the 
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political apparatus. On the other, the lesser female active participation in politics could make 
women less critical of democratic standards.   
Discussion of the Findings 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of our analyses. From columns 1 and 3 in Table 4, we 
see that regime experience does in fact have an impact on how much individuals trust in the 
national government and parliament. Belonging to the dual regime political generation rather 
than the democratically socialized generation increases the probability of trust in these 
democratic governance institutions, slightly more so in the government than in the parliament.  
[Table 4 and 5 about here] 
The overall sample findings also show that for both trust in government and trust in 
parliament and in both the additive and interactive models, the winner/loser effect, economic 
perceptions and ideology are significant with coefficients of a similar magnitude for trust in 
either institution. Only the first two—winner/loser effect and economic perceptions—produce 
an effect when the newly established democracies are considered.  As expected, identifying 
with the political party having won in the last election period increases the chances of having 
confidence in the democratic governing structures. The winners have a more positive affect for 
these institutions than would those individuals having voted for a party in the opposition.  The 
political relevance of regime experience is most powerfully seen through its impact on the 
strength of the winner/loser effect on trust. The magnitude of the effect of this experience more 
than doubles when the individuals had previously lived in an authoritarian regime, thus 
providing evidence of a political generational effect in newly established democracies. The 
difference in the probability of trusting in the government among the older versus younger 
individuals is larger in the case of newer democracies. We are hypothesizing that this is 
attributable to regime experience.   
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Individuals´ sociotropic perceptions of how well the country has been doing 
economically also performed as expected. The greater the approval of the nation´s economic 
state, the more trusting they are of the government and the parliament. And the size of this 
effect is independent of the democratic history of the nation for the coefficient is very nearly the 
same in the pooled sample estimates and the dividing sample estimates shown on Table 5 
pertaining to the two subsets of nations. Also in Table 5, we estimated the same additive and 
interactive models only here we divided the sample into the longer established democracies and 
the newer democracies. As we can see, there is no discernible difference between one set of 
countries and the other. 
Upon examination of the demographic determinants of political trust in the pooled 
sample, social class and age are the only variables that appear to have an effect on political trust 
in the predicted direction. The higher a respondent´s socioeconomic status, the more likely that 
respondent will trust in the institutions. The other demographic effect on political confidence 
comes from the age of the individual. Although small, this effect due to age does seem to make 
a difference in the sense that as individuals get older, they are more likely to express trust in 
government. Oddly, this is not so when it comes to trust in the legislative body because, as far 
as we can tell, age does not matter. Table 5 tells us that this effect however does not seem to 
exist when it comes to trusting in the parliament in new democracies.  This makes sense in these 
newer democracies for the democratic history is not long enough for there to be a substantial 
difference due to age alone.  
Consistent with the inferences drawn from Table 4, we see an effect from the 
experience of a regime other than the democratic regime. This effect is seen in the difference of 
the winner/loser effect between subsets. In the additive models (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), this 
effect on the probability of trust in government is nearly 3 times as large as the effect in the 
older democracies and twice as large in the case of trust in parliament. The generation dummy, 
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being calculated in the same manner as the regime experience dummy, separating those 
individuals aged 30 and above from those aged 29 and younger, is always scored zero on the 
regime experience variable, and because the regime experience variable for the newer 
democracies coincides with the generation dummy in the older democracies, the two models are 
comparable. 
In the interactive models, the mediating effect of belonging to the older generation has a 
positive and much higher effect in the case of the new democracies, but only for trust in the 
national parliament. This leads us to infer that the generational gap is greater in new 
democracies than in old democracies. As discussed above, we understand this difference to be 
attributable to the common ground among the nations in each subset: the presence or absence of 
two political regime generations or in other words, a difference in regime experience.  
Figures 1a and 1b illustratively synthesizes our findings. They compare a hypothetical 
situation of two typically aged, lower middle class, high school graduate males, ideologically 
positioned at the Center but leaning toward the Left, and fairly interested in politics that believe 
the state of their nation´s economic performance has remained stable for the past year. The 
difference between these two 44-year-olds is that one has lived in a dictatorship until he was 24, 
meaning he was politically socialized in an authoritarian regime. The probability of trusting in 
government is higher, for instance, for a Dane compared to the Portuguese man of the same age 
by about .3. However, the difference between the strength of this man´s winning effect on 
political trust and, say, that of a 25-year-old Portuguese man of the same social background is 
higher than the difference between a Danish 44-year-old and a Danish 25-year-old by about .23. 
[Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of 
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political trust by incorporating less well established democracies in the systematic studies of 
political trust and developing an explanation for why and how political confidence in the 
democratic institutions may differ between older and newer democracies that are usually 
excluded from analyses due to their short democratic history. As we found, shorter democratic 
experience is important to incorporate in our thinking of the development of political attitudes 
among the citizens living in these countries. 
We proposed a generational hypothesis, whereby citizens living in democratic countries 
that have been in existence for a relatively short period differ in how they view the governing 
institutions.  These individuals can be divided into two distinct political generations: 1.) those 
whose preadult political socialization began in an authoritarian regime and is marked by a 
transition to democracy, the “dual regime” generation; 2.) a new political generation coming of 
age in a democratic setting, the “democratically socialized” generation.  Not only did we argue 
that the experience of the older generation in these countries would be different based on their 
experience with political life in a dictatorship alone, but we posited that this experience would 
condition each generation´s effect of winning and losing on their trust in the democratic regime. 
Our results conform to the expanding body of literature on the political relevance of the 
effects of supporting the winning party or coalition. They show that belonging to the political 
majority and feeling more popular control over what and how political life treats them has a 
positive effect on political trust.  More importantly, the evidence clearly supports our hypothesis 
of a second political effect—that of regime experience.  We learned that while the probability of 
trust in the political institutions is higher in more mature democracies, the effect of people´s 
identification with the winners matters less in these countries than in newer democracies, 
possibility because there is some probability that elections will not be held again, thus 
determining winners and losers for the foreseeable future. Those having had the experience of 
two completely different governing regimes not only trust more than the younger generation, 
 20
but their feeling of being able to participate and be heard by the governing institutions is greater 
because of it.  Thus, compared to their younger compatriots and people of their own age 
generation in older democracies who have not experienced breakdown, winning will have a 
stronger positive and losing a stronger negative effect on trust.  
This raises the question of what will happen to confidence in the democratic institutions 
as the “dual regime” generation in the newer democracies is replaced by the younger, less 
trusting individuals of the “democratically socialized” generation.  As a nation´s history of 
democratic institutions increases and as the new political generation, socialized in democratic 
rule replaces the older dual regime generation, this effect should diminish and be less powerful 
in determining individual political confidence in the system. As time elapses and the older folks 
die out in these countries, the democratic political generation will age. Their levels will likely 
approximate those of the present older generation in the more established democracies just as 
the democratic generations of these older democracies replaced the authoritarian generation at 
one point in time. If the political trust questions were available on a yearly basis, one could test 
to see if and how the effect regime experience on political trust changes with the passage of 
time, as the dual regime generation social learning process progresses. But this frequency of the 
political trust question does not of yet exist. 
This difference is not much due to the age difference between these two groups, but 
rather to their political experience with the historical and political events marking their 
generation. All in all, we believe our analysis provides support for the need to build the 
contextual and historical particularities into our theorizing and models about confidence and 
support for democratic governance.
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Table 1: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Description N Min Max Mean StDev 
TrustGovt Political Trust in the national government 11325 0 1 .537 .499 
TrustParl Political Trust in the national parliament 11107 0 1 .568 .495 
Winner/Loser Respondent´s past vote (coded 1 if voted for 
party in government, 0 if otherwise or 
nonvoters) 
10306 0 1 .395 .489 
Regime Dummy variable indicating experience with 
authoritarian regime (coded 1 if respondent 
experienced authoritarian regime, 0 if 
otherwise) 
13060 0 1 .243 .429 
Win/Loser * Regime Interaction of regime with winner/loser 10304 0 1 .329 .470 
Generation Dummy variable indicating whether the 
respondent belongs to an older or younger 
generation (coded 1 if belonging to older, 0 if 
belonging to younger). 
13060 0 1 .734 .442 
Win/Los * Generation Interaction of Generation Winner/Loser 10304 0 1 .088 .283 
Age Exact age of the respondent 13061 13 98 43.545 17.863 
Ideology Left-Right score (coded –1 if Left, 0 if Center, 
and 1 if Right) 
12132 -1 1 -.099 .741 
Economic Perceptions Sociotropic perception of national economic 
performance (high means greater approval) 
12763 1 5 2.845 .999 
Interest in Politics Interest in politics (high means greater 
interest) 
12977 1 4 2.331 .928 
Gender Dummy variable indicating gender (coded 1 if 
male and 0 if female) 
13063 0 1 .493 .500 
Education Education level of the respondent (high means 
higher level of education) 
12952 1 10 4.824 3.210 
Social Class Class of respondent (high means upper class) 12090 1 5 2.347 1.057 
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Table 2 Generational Frequencies 
 
Generations Pooled Sample 
Older Generation  73.4% 
Younger Generation 26.6% 
Dual Regime 24.3% 
Democratic Regime 75.7% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Mean Comparisons 
 
 Old  
Democracies 
New 
Democracies 
Dual 
Regime 
Democratic 
Regime 
Winners Losers 
TrustGovt .589 .423 .566 .448 .678 .463 
TrustParl .606 .485 .591 .498 .682 .511 
Win/Los .414 .351 .399 .383 -- -- 
Age 43.315 44.074 -- -- 47.591 41.805 
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Table 4: Logit Results of the Determinants of Political Trust, Pooled Sample 
 
 Government  Parliament  
Variables Additive Interactive Additive Interactive 
Winner/Loser .684*** 
(.052) 
.462*** 
(.059) 
.496*** 
(.052) 
.331*** 
(.059) 
Regime .357*** 
(.125) 
-.013 
(.136) 
.259** 
(.125) 
.003 
(.134) 
Winner/Loser * Regime  .912*** 
(.122) 
 .671*** 
(.120) 
Age .003** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
Economic Perceptions .464*** 
(.027) 
.454*** 
(.027) 
.426*** 
(.026) 
.419*** 
(.027) 
Ideology .145*** 
(.033) 
.161*** 
(.034) 
.087*** 
(.033) 
.097*** 
(.033) 
Interest in Politics -.017 
(.029) 
-.008 
(.030) 
.021 
(.029) 
.028 
(.029) 
Education -.016 
(.010) 
-.017* 
(.010) 
.011 
(.010) 
.010 
(.010) 
Social Class .124*** 
(.026) 
.130*** 
(.026) 
.081*** 
(.026) 
.084*** 
(.026) 
Gender -.018 
(.050) 
-.020 
(.050) 
-.006 
(.050) 
-.006 
(.050) 
Belgium .461*** 
(.175) 
.407** 
(.180) 
.489*** 
(.174) 
.470*** 
(.177) 
Denmark 1.101*** 
(.170) 
1.034*** 
(.175) 
1.194*** 
(.170) 
1.166*** 
(.172) 
France .896*** 
(.171) 
.798*** 
(.177) 
.615*** 
(.170) 
.568*** 
(.172) 
Ireland .428** 
(.179) 
.378** 
(.184) 
.155 
(.177) 
.140 
(.179) 
Italy .266 
(.180) 
.222 
(.184) 
.547*** 
(.179) 
.529*** 
(.180) 
Luxembourg 2.162*** 
(.255) 
2.123*** 
(.258) 
1.797*** 
(.236) 
1.795*** 
(.238) 
Netherlands 1.251*** 
(.172) 
1.211*** 
(.177) 
1.091*** 
(.170) 
1.082*** 
(.172) 
UK .150 
(.166) 
.067 
(.171) 
.254 
(.165) 
.211 
(.167) 
West Germany .835*** 
(.176) 
.759*** 
(.181) 
.881*** 
(.176) 
.846*** 
(.178) 
Greece .352*** 
(.124) 
.266** 
(.133) 
.561*** 
(.123) 
.511*** 
(.128) 
Portugal -.309** 
(.133) 
-.410*** 
(.145) 
-.116 
(.133) 
-.178 
(.140) 
Spain -.189 
(.130) 
-.239* 
(.138) 
.417*** 
(.130) 
.398*** 
(.134) 
Constant -2.261*** 
(.193) 
-2.121*** 
(.199) 
-2.095*** 
(.194) 
-2.010*** 
(.197) 
N 7915 7915 7820 7820 
Pseudo R2 .112 .117 .084 .087 
Log Likelihood -4823.089 -4794.634 -4853.413 -4837.644 
% Correctly Predicted 67.61 67.50 65.88 65.78 
Note: East Germany is the reference category. 
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Table 5 Logit Results of the Determinants of Political Trust in New and Established Democracies 
 
        
     
       
 
Established Democracies New Democracies
 Government  Parliament  Government  Parliament
Variables Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive
Winner/Loser .404*** .243* 
(.062) (.129) 
.306*** 
(.062) 
.158 
(.127) 
1.317*** 
(.097) 
1.094*** 
(.228) 
.907*** 
(.096) 
.483** 
(.226) 
Generation/Regime  
      
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
-.064
(.095) 
-.130 
(.105) 
.145 
(.094) 
.083 
(.106) 
.402** 
(.162) 
.311* 
(.181) 
.276** 
(157 
.122 
(.172) 
Winner/Loser * Regime  .204 
(.145) 
.188
(.143) 
.272
(.252) 
.518**
(.249) 
Age .006** .006** 
(.003) (.003) 
.002 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.000 
(.004) 
.000 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
Economic Perceptions .444*** 
(.032) 
.444*** 
(.032) 
.420*** 
(.032) 
.420*** 
(.032) 
.484*** 
(.050) 
.480*** 
(.050) 
.420*** 
(.048) 
.413*** 
(.048) 
Ideology .207*** .140*** 
(.040) (.031) 
.111** 
(.040) 
.109** 
(.040) 
.062 
(.063) 
.058 
(.063) 
.085 
(.061) 
.078 
(.061) 
Interest in Politics -.008 
(.036) 
-.007 
(.036) 
.029 
(.036) 
.030 
(.036) 
-.021 
(0.53) 
-.018 
(.053) 
.003 
(.052) 
.009 
(.052) 
Education -.018 -.018 
(.013) (.013) 
.018 
(.013) 
.018 
(.013) 
-.007 
(.174) 
-.009 
(.018) 
.007 
(.017) 
.003 
(.017) 
Social Class .141*** 
(.031) 
.140*** 
(.031) 
.107*** 
(.031) 
.106*** 
(.031) 
.097* 
(.052) 
.099* 
(.052) 
.005 
(.050) 
.007 
(.050) 
Gender -.003 -.004 
(.059) (.059) 
-.005 
(.060) 
-.006 
(.060) 
-.054 
(.094) 
-.056 
(.095) 
.001 
(.091) 
-.003 
(.091) 
Belgium -.352** -.355** 
(.127) (.127) 
-.362*** 
(.130) 
-.365** 
(.130) 
Denmark .275** .276** 
(.122) (.122) 
.310** 
(127) 
.311** 
(.127) 
France .035 .033 
(.120) (.121) 
-.275** 
(.122) 
-.278** 
(.122) 
Ireland -.378*** -.375** 
(.130) (.130) 
-.692*** 
(.132) 
-.689*** 
(.132) 
Italy -.531*** -.527*** 
(.130) (130) 
-.308** 
(.133) 
-.304** 
(.133) 
Table 5 Continued 
        
       
     
       
     
 Established Democracies New Democracies
 Government  Parliament  Government  Parliament
Variables Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive Additive Interactive
Luxembourg 1.372*** 1.369*** 
(.221) (.221) 
.949*** 
(.202) 
.946*** 
(.203) 
Netherlands     
     
      
      
      
 
         
.461*** .464*** 
(.122) (.122) 
.239* 
(.122) 
.243** 
(.123) 
UK -.697*** -.700*** 
(.112) (.122) 
-.613*** 
(.115) 
-.616*** 
(.115) 
Greece .378***
(.143) 
.372*** 
(144) 
.567*** 
(.137) 
 
Portugal -309**
(149) 
-.320** 
(.149) 
-126 
(.144) 
-.146 
(.145) 
Spain -.153
(143) 
-.159 
(.144) 
.460*** 
(.139) 
.452*** 
(.140) 
Constant -1.367*** -1.320*** 
(.183) (.186) 
-1.326*** 
(.186) 
-1.280*** 
(.189) 
-2.421*** 
(.290) 
-2.331*** 
(.302) 
-1.858*** 
(.280) 
-1.706*** 
(.289) 
N 5646 5646 5569 5569 2269 2269 2251 2251
Pseudo R2 .098        
         
         
.098 .081 .081 .129 .130 .079 .081
Log Likelihood -3425.989 -3425.026 -3399.199 -3398.375 -1360.996 -1360.418 -1435.700 -1433.522
% Correctly Predicted 67.27 67.43 67.32 67.19 68.09 68.09 63.75 63.26
 
 Notes:  1. East Germany is the reference category in the case of the new democracies and West Germany is the reference category in the case of the established democracies. 
 2. The additive models in the case of the established democracies were also run without the age variable to check our suspicion that the inclusion of this variable was causing the 
generation variable to fall to insignificance. We found that the generation dummy with the age variable is statistically significant in all cases. 
3. We also ran the interactive models without the generation/regime dummies to avoid having a multicollinearity problem given that the age variable would be present in the 
generation/regime dummy and in the interaction term. The exclusion of these variables produced only one important change and that is that the winner/loser interaction term is statistically 
significant but not the regime dummy per se in the case of trust in government for the new democracies.
Figure 1a and 1b Change Comparison in the Predicted Probability Trusting in the 
Government due to Winning and Losing in Portugal and the UK 
1a. 
Predicted Probability of Trust in Government for Dual 
Regime Generation in Portugal (New Democracy)
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1b. 
Predicted Probability of Trust in Government for Older 
Generation in Denmark (Established Democracy) 
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Predicted Probability of Political Trust in Government 
 
   Portuguese  Dane 
 Additive Interactive Additive Interactive 
∆ Winner/Loser (.400 -.308)=  . 092 (.618 –. 292)= .326 (.716 - .627)= .089 (.731 - .634)= .097 
 
  
Appendix: Question Wording 
The data for this study are found in the 1994 Eurobarometer (#42).   
 
                                  
Political trust in Government. 
Can you rely on the national government?  
1 yes 
 0 no                                                       
     
Political trust in Parliament. 
Can you rely on the national parliament? 
1 if yes 
0 if no                                                     
     
Winner Loser Effect. 
Which party did you vote for at the last "General Election" 
 1 if voted for the party(ies) in government 
 0 if otherwise 
 
Economic Perceptions. 
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that … 
5 A lot better 
4 A little better 
3 Stayed the same 
2 A little worse 
1 A lot of worse     
     
Ideology. 
Left-Right scale  
-1 if on the Left 
0  if on the Center 
1  if on the Right                                                 
 
Interest in Politics. 
To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? 
1 A great deal 
2 To some extent 
3 Not much 
4 Not at all                                                          
 
Education. 
Age when respondent stopped full-time education  
10 categories where high means more years of schooling                                                        
 
 1
Gender.  
1 if male 
0 if female                                                                  
 
Age. 
How old are you?    
 Exact age in years. 
Social Class. 
If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would 
you say you belong to? 
1 Working class 
2 Lower middle class 
3 Middle class 
4 Upper class 
5 Upper middle class 
 
 
  
 
 2
